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One of the meanings or senses of 'in 
touch' in English is 'in communication'. 
We talk of being 'in touch' with 
someone, meaning that we know them 
and that we are in communication with 
them. We also speak of being 'out of 
touch' with someone, meaning that we 
are not in contact with them, that we 
are not communicating with them. And 
we talk of being 'put in touch' with 
someone: this usually means that a 
third party has made contact or 
established communications on our 
behalf, between us and someone else. 
Sometimes, sadly, we talk of 'losing 
touch' with someone, meaning that we 
were in contact with someone, maybe 
through Christmas cards or WhatsApp 
but are no longer in communication 
with them.. 
 
Other languages also make or perform 
this metaphorical shift. According to 
Google Translate, touch translates as 
contato in Portuguese. And Portuguese 
also makes this metaphorical slide 
from touch to being in touch, in 
contact and thus in communication 
with someone. Google Translate tells 
me that 'Entrar em contato' means to 
get in touch with someone. Touch is 
slightly different in French but one of 
the translations of touch in French is 
also contact and 'en contact avec' 
means to be in communication with 
someone in French.  The metaphorical 
drift from in touch, being in touch, 
through contact to communication is 
common to many languages. We might 
say that touch translates into 
communication, or it communicates by 
keeping in touch, with in or through 
various languages. And I'd like to think 
about this conceptual and textual 
contact in the present paper. 
 
Famously, the other translations of 
touch in French are le toucher and la 
touche and I will be touching on, 
talking and writing a little more about, 
Derrida's investigations of these words 
later. 
 
 
 
 
 
First, I'd like to think a little bit more 
about the sense of communication and 
its conceptual connections to culture, 
and then the relation to textiles and 
clothing. From the world of cultural 
studies, Colin Cherry says 'a group of 
people, a society, a culture, I would 
define as "people in communication"' 
(Cherry 1957: 4). This is interesting - 
Cherry defines a culture in terms of a 
group of people who are in 
communication with each other, who 
are in touch with each other.  
 
In a lot of cultural studies, the standard 
model or explanation of this being in 
touch and this communication is the 
sender/receiver model. This model or 
understanding really is as simple as it 
sounds: a sender sends a message 
through a channel and that message is 
received by a receiver. There is usually 
a complication, in the form of noise, 
added to this model. Noise is defined 
as anything received by the receiver 
that was not sent by the sender. It may 
not need pointing out but it may help 
to know that this model of 
communication originated in 
telephonic engineering around the 
middle of the twentieth century. The 
technology and the problems 
accompanying that technology have 
driven the conceptual apparatus and 
the explanations it is able to give ever 
since. 
 
Textiles and clothing are said to be 
means or modes of communication and 
they are commonly or routinely 
understood and explained in terms of 
this sender/receiver model. People 
happily and thoughtlessly say we send 
messages with the textiles we use and 
the clothes we wear. People also 
happily and thoughtlessly say that we 
express ourselves through what we 
wear. These phrases are commonplace 
in everyday speech, in journalism and 
even. I'm sad to say, in academic 
journals and university departments.  
  
 
This Roz Chast cartoon, for example, 
illustrates the sender/receiver model of 
communication and it shows how 
clothing and textiles are thought to 
send messages on this model. Rhonda 
Perlmutter III's stripy skirt sends the 
message that 'mother lives in 
Sacramento, but we speak quite often 
on the telephone'. Her bow sends the 
message that Rhonda doesn't like to 
dust. The idea is that Rhonda, or the 
garments, (and here is a clue to some 
of the deficiencies of the model) send 
messages. These messages are sent 
through the channel of the garments or 
the textiles. And they are received by 
the receivers.  
 
Chast is clearly having a lot of fun 
lampooning the sender/receiver model 
of communication and satirizing the 
idea that textiles and clothes send 
messages in this way. As I hinted, the 
model has many deficiencies. One is 
that it is not clear who or what the 
sender is: is it Rhonda or is it, as the 
image suggests, the garments? Might it 
not also and equally plausibly be the 
textiles designer, or the fashion 
designer? Similarly, it is not clear who 
is the receiver. Is it Rhonda? Is it us? Is 
it the person or the fashion company 
who commissioned the design? And 
finally there is the problem of noise. In 
order to identify noise, one would have 
to know what was and what was not 
sent by the sender, in order to tell the 
difference between it and whatever 
was received by the receiver. This 
assumes that the sender is in full and 
total control of the message and has a 
complete and unchanging 
understanding of the message which 
they can document and record once 
and for all. However, the world is full 
of supposed senders who either do not 
know what the message is, or was, or 
who change their minds about the 
nature or content of the message. 
Given this manifest lack of control and 
possible absence of or change in 
understanding, noise does not and 
cannot exist. 
 
However, apart from anything else and 
more importantly for us, this model 
assumes that there is a self that exists 
before the expression or the sending of 
the messages, before the being in touch 
and before the communication. 
Simply, on this model, Rhonda exists 
and then sends messages using textiles 
and clothing. I would like to argue that 
this is not what happens and that 
textiles have a much more complex 
and a much more significant role than 
that of the channel through which pre-
existing subjects and selves and 
cultures send messages about 
themselves. 
 
 
 
From the world of French philosophy, 
Jean-Luc Nancy offers a slightly 
different but not incompatible 
perspective from that of Cherry and 
Chast. He argues that 'Being in touch is 
what makes us "us"' (Nancy Being 
Singular Plural p. 13, quoted in 
Derrida On Touching p. 115). This is 
an argument about the conditions for 
the possibility for there being either a 
singular or a plural us. Either an 'us' as 
a single self or subject or an 'us' as a 
group or culture. Nancy has the 
condition the other way round from the 
sender/receiver model and his 
argument is more in line with Chast's 
critique of this model. 
 
It is not that there is a subject or a self, 
let alone an 'us', that then sends 
messages, communicates or expresses 
itself through some exterior material or 
textile. Rather the exterior material or 
textile makes the self and the us 
possible: the supposedly exterior 
material or textile is the condition for 
there being a subject or self. The being 
in touch, the representation in and 
through some exterior thing or text/ile 
is the condition for there being an 'us' 
or a we. This is what Nancy means 
when he says that being in touch 
makes us 'us' - the representation 
through the exterior material makes a 
self or an 'us' possible 'in the first 
place'. 
 
However, the point is also that touch is 
not direct or unmediated - between 
toucher and touched, my hand and an 
object, my hand and an other person or 
even my own hand and my own other 
hand, there is always a mediation, 
some material, some prosthesis 
between toucher and touched (Hillis 
Miller 2009: 297). As Derrida has it in 
On Touching, we have to get away or 
dissociate ourselves from the common 
sense or the philosophical sense of 
touch as immediacy (Derrida 2005: 
119). Some prosthetic, some technical 
object, some art or artifice always 
comes between us and the thing or the 
person we think or believe ourselves to 
be in touch with, to be in contact or 
communication with. 
 
Firstly, as Hillis Miller argues, 'Words, 
marks of some kind, always come 
between touching-touched and 
touching-touched' (Hillis Miller 2009: 
297). As far as language is concerned, 
Hillis Miller's point is that, for 'us' to 
even have the experience of 
touching/being touched, and for us to 
be said to be having any experience or 
perception at all, it is necessary that 
that experience or perception be 
'presented' or represented to ourselves 
and the only way we have of doing that 
is through the use of language, using 
concepts as the form and content of 
words. 
 
Secondly, 'some form of materiality, 
like a sort of intervening skin or 
membrane, always comes between the 
two touchers and touched, even when I 
touch myself' (Hillis Miller 2009: 297-
8). Another word for this materiality, 
this intervening skin or membrane, 
would be textiles. Language, and 
textiles, are different forms or different 
ways of identifying and describing the 
thing, the prosthesis, that is not us and 
which comes between us as touching-
touched or us as perceiving-perceived 
and makes the experience or the 
perception possible. 
 
At the same moment, in the same 
movement, this prosthetic at once 
makes possible and destroys 
experience- even the experience of 
ourselves as selves - most importantly 
for this conference, even our sense of 
ourselves as an I or an us. This 'in 
touch' (this textile) both makes 
possible and destroys, or more 
accurately mediates and delays, our 
experience of ourselves as an I and as 
an us. Even to have a sense, a 
knowledge or an experience of 
ourselves as selves or as subjects, 
some exterior thing (language, most 
importantly, but also text in the sense 
of a textile) is necessary. We have no 
direct or immediate contact with or 
intuition of our selves or of ourselves 
as subjects: we are not even in touch 
with ourselves in any direct or 
immediate way - some external thing, 
such as language or I want to argue 
textile, makes contact and therefore us 
possible. 
 
Ultimately this impossibility of being 
in touch with ourselves in any 
immediate, or unmediated way, 
without some external thing (what I 
will explain as the prosthesis) both 
making that contact possible and 
deferring or complicating and delaying 
it, is the product of the work of 
Edmund Husserl.  Husserl's 
phenomenology is based on the idea of 
a simple and unmediated present 
instant or moment but is actually 
undermined from within by the idea 
that what we experience and 
understand as the immediate and 
punctual present instant is complicated 
by past retentions and future 
protentions. 
 
Past retentions are basically memories 
and future protentions are basically 
anticipations or expectations 
concerning the future.  Both are 
representations of things that are not 
simply or fully present but which are 
the conditions for our experience of a 
full and simple present. Therefore, 
there is no direct experience of the 
simple present or of our simple selves 
in that simple present - it is always 
represented in something that is not us, 
in something exterior to us. Derrida 
argues that this exterior thing is text, or 
writing. It is some exterior and 
material thing that is not us. To give a 
hint of where I am going with this, or 
more accurately where I am trying to 
follow Derrida with this - the exterior 
material thing that is not us but which 
makes us possible through 
communication is the prosthetic, the 
technical - textiles, for example. 
 
This exterior materiality that Derrida 
calls writing or the trace and that Hillis 
Miller mentions is usually language 
but as Hillis Miller also mentions it is 
also a membrane, a sort of intervening 
skin. It is thus a textile, and it is also 
what we wear: it is also clothing and 
fashion. The link between text and 
textiles is not fortuitous and Derrida 
makes much of it at various places in 
his work. The link to style in and of 
Derrida's work, and thus to fashion in 
the work of textiles, is also not 
fortuitous and Derrida makes much of 
this as well. 
 
 
One of the consequences of these 
arguments is that textiles and thus 
clothing and fashion are not messages 
to or from pre-existing subjects, selves 
or cultural groups: textiles and clothing 
are also by no means direct means or 
modes of communication. On this 
argument, in order for us to be a 
subject, or an us, or a 'we' as Nancy 
has it, we have to represent ourselves, 
our self or our subjectivity, to 
ourselves - and we can only do that 
though some external thing - 
language/text.  
 
 
For Derrida and Nancy, it also means 
that the material, the text or the textile 
does not follow the toucher/touched: 
both toucher and touched, even when I 
touch myself, always follow or are 
made possible by the materiality, the 
text or textile. As I suggested Nancy 
reverses the direction of the condition 
so that being in touch, being in 
communication by means of textiles, is 
the condition of there being an us, of 
there being a self or a subject or a 
culture. 
 
 
This something that follows or is 
secondary is also mentioned by Hillis 
Miller when he mentions the prosthesis 
(Hillis Miller 2009: 297). Therefore, 
this argument, this reversal of the 
direction of the condition, also means 
that we must adjust or in some cases 
abandon our notion of textiles and 
clothing as substitutive or 
supplementary prosthesis. They are 
both often, too often, thought of as 
substitutive prostheses - as something 
that stands in for or supplements 
something else that already exists but 
is deficient or lacking in some way 
 
This is the sense of prosthesis that the 
Roz Chast cartoon depends upon for its 
humour and which it satirizes - the 
items of clothing are prostheses in the 
sense that they represent, stand in or 
substitute for what Rhonda means and 
thus who she is. The textiles and the 
garments are believed to send 
messages about her, they are not her 
but they stand for her and her 
messages. This is the routine or 
everyday sense of textiles and clothing 
that they send messages about us - 
somehow coming after us, they 
represent or stand in for us. 
 
However, on the constitutive 
prosthesis account of textiles and 
clothing, the items make her and her 
messages possible; the textiles and the 
materiality make her and her meanings 
possible. They are the condition for 
her, for her identity and thus her sense 
of self. In this new(ish) account of 
textiles as prosthesis, there is no 
substitution - in this sense the textiles 
make the thing possible in the first 
place 
 
This is Derrida's concept of the 
constitutive prosthesis, which he works 
on in his (2010) Copy, Archive, 
Signature. Derrida explains that the 
constitutive prosthesis makes 
experience, even perception, possible. 
As he says, 'there is no perception 
before the possibility of prosthetic 
iterability' (Derrida 2010: 14). 
Derrida's argument is that it is not that 
there is experience or perception and 
then something like a textile or a 
garment (or a word) communicates 
that experience and perception. Rather 
the textile, the materiality, the thing 
that is not us and that is therefore a 
prosthetic, makes that experience and 
perception possible (Derrida 2010:  13-
14). This argument uses or represents a 
whole new sense of the idea that we 
are in touch through textiles and what 
we wear. This is the sense in which we 
are, we only come to be, to exist 
because of textiles, because of what we 
wear. On this account, textiles and 
fashions as constitutive prostheses are 
the conditions of our existence, not the 
consequences of it. 
 
This is the paradox of the constitutive 
prosthesis - it is a prosthesis, it is an 
exterior thing and it is an addition, but 
it makes the thing to which it is 
exterior and to which it is an addition 
possible in the first place. Thus there is 
no subject until the subject represents 
itself (even to itself) in or though the 
exterior materiality of 
language/text/textile. One consequence 
of this argument is that we do not 
express ourselves through textiles or 
what we wear. Not only are Rhonda's 
clothes and hat not sending messages, 
they are also not expressing her 
interior thoughts or feelings. For us to 
express ourselves in or through what 
we wear, there has to be something 
inside that is pressed or forced out, that 
is what express means. 
 
There also has to be a subject, a self or 
some content that we take to be a self 
in order for it to be ex-pressed. The 
point of the constitutive prosthesis is 
that there is no I, no self and no 
'content' until it has been represented 
in something that is not it and that 
exists outside and apart from it - the 
prosthesis or textile. It also means that 
we do not send messages with what we 
wear, or that our clothes send 
messages about us. Roz Chast's 
critique of the sender/receiver model is 
accurate and should be fatal; it is an 
absurd model of communication and I 
wonder how we keep using it. 
 
There is no 'we' and there is no 'us' 
until the meaning of the textile has 
been constructed by whoever is 
looking at us, or touching us, including 
us as we touch ourselves (Derrida 
2005). This is the meaning of Nancy's 
argument that being in touch makes us 
'us'. It is not that there is an us, either 
an individual or a collective us, and 
then we get in touch via textiles and 
fashion. The 'in touch' of the textiles 
and the fashion make us an 'us', 'in the 
first place'. The problem indicated by 
the scare-quotes  is, clearly, that there 
is and can be no first place, just as 
there can be no messages sent or 
received.   
 
Finally, this argument concerning the 
understanding of textiles as the or a 
constitutive prothesis is consistent with 
a very odd thing that Thomas Carlyle 
says in Sartor Resartus. In this book, 
he declares that 'society ... is founded 
on cloth' (Carlyle 1987: 48). I have 
noted elsewhere (Barnard 2002: 49) 
that this is an astonishing thing to 
suggest and I don't know anyone who 
takes him up or makes issue with him 
on this point. I suspect that 
commentators think this is either a 
provocative or throwaway comment 
from someone who has form in this 
area, or that it can be safely ignored.  
 
Actually, this idea of the constitutive 
prosthesis is a both condition for and a 
development of what Carlyle says in 
Sartor Resartus. In order to understand 
Carlyle's idea of society being founded 
on cloth, we have first to make sense 
of the idea of the textile or fashionable 
prosthesis being a condition for, not a 
consequence of, our various 
identifications. By identifications I 
mean the ways in which we construct 
ourselves - our class, social, cultural, 
sexual, gender and national 
identifications, for example. This is the 
idea of the constitutive prosthesis. 
 
The condition for his being able to say 
what he says is the constitutive 
prosthesis. Carlyle is correct to say that 
cloth, or textiles, make society possible 
so long as we conceive of cloth or 
textiles as constitutive prosthesis. As 
Cherry points out, 'a society ... a 
culture, I would define as "people in 
communication"' (Cherry 1957: 4). 
Communication may be explained as 
the condition for there being a society 
or a culture. Following Nancy, I have 
argued that textiles, as 'in touch' and as 
communication are the condition for 
'us' being an 'us'. If we take the 'us' to 
be a society or a culture, then textiles 
or cloth are what makes society 
possible, just as Carlyle says. And one 
of the consequences is that subjectivity 
and thus intersubjectivity, identity, 
society and culture, are made possible 
by the constitutive prosthetic that is 
textiles. 
 
And it is a development of what 
Carlyle says in that Carlyle never goes 
this far; he never identifies the 
condition for his being able to say that 
society is founded on cloth. He is more 
interested at this point in presenting the 
outrageous pronouncements of 
Professor Teufelsdröckh than in the 
conditions or consequences of those 
pronouncements. However, we are 
interested and we can investigate and 
suggest some of the conditions and 
consequences. It is not that we are, that 
we exist, or that we have an individual 
or cultural identity or meaning and 
then we get dressed, or then we use 
textiles and fashion: the textiles and 
the fashions are the condition for the 
possibility of us being an individual, 
an us or a we and they start the process 
of identification 'in the first place'.  
 
For all these reasons, textiles is much 
more important than even textile 
designers think and being or keeping in 
touch is the condition of our existence, 
not something that may befall us or 
happen by chance. 
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